Of late, I have been
reflecting on work issues that have to do with people from different parts of
the world in their acts of relating to each other. As is to be expected in
human affairs, some of these relations work better than others. But as is
experienced of such trans-national, trans-cultural affairs, humans struggle to
make connect of amiable kind without developing commonality of interests.
I turned to some base fundamental research on perception to
understand the issue. Specifically, I was drawn to a research titled The Neural
Substrates of In-Group Bias : A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Investigation, (2008) Jay J. Van Bavel, Dominic J. Packer, and William A.
Cunningham, The Ohio State University.
Let me quote their abstract before presenting my propositions,
thereof. “Classic minimal-group studies
found that people arbitrarily assigned to a novel group quickly display a range
of perceptual, affective, and behavioral in-group biases. We randomly assigned
participants to a mixed-race team and used functional magnetic resonance imaging
to identify brain regions involved in processing novel in-group and out-group
members independently of pre-existing attitudes, stereotypes, or familiarity.
Whereas previous research on intergroup perception found amygdala activity—typically
interpreted as negativity—in response to stigmatized social groups, we found
greater activity in the amygdala, fusiform gyri, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and
dorsal striatum when participants viewed novel in-group faces than when they
viewed novel out-group faces. Moreover, activity in orbitofrontal cortex
mediated the in-group bias in self-reported liking for the faces. These
in-group biases in neural activity were not moderated by race or by whether
participants explicitly attended to team membership or race, a finding suggesting that they may occur
automatically. This study helps clarify the role of neural substrates involved
in perceptual and affective in-group biases.”
The news from this research is that in-group biases happen
involuntarily or automatically, and that in-group members are processed in
greater depth than outgroup members. In-group biases in perception is therefore
highly motivated. Contexts of economic, psychological and evolutionary
significance were salient triggers for such motivation. Why I lean a bit on
this body of work is because of neural correlates to perception in evidence.
“Participants with a
stronger preference for in-group members exhibited stronger OFC activity in
response to in-group relative to outgroup members.” “…this is the first fMRI study to identify the
neural mediators of self-reported intergroup biases, and it demonstrates an
important link between the pervasive preference for novel in-group members and
brain regions that process reward and subjective value. In-group biases in
neural activity did not require explicit attention to team membership. Although
the tasks differed in difficulty (judging by the faster reaction times and
higher accuracy in the implicit task), neural
in-group biases did not differ across tasks. This finding suggests that
these biases are relatively automatic.”
Hence, there is considerable implication in the way we participate,
inter-relate or coordinate activities in a group. This is pertinent to learning
and development because, of two basic processes. Firstly, we tend to categorize
perceptions. Secondly, learning results in encoded memory.
While the Table below is a long-shot from automaticity of
perception, I lay it out here in relation to language in developmental work in
groups and organizations.
|
Value
Precept
|
Socialized
Attitude
|
Philosophy
of Practice
|
|
Justice
|
Fairness
|
Social Contract
|
|
Truth
|
Honesty
|
Scientism
|
|
Transparency
|
Openness
|
Liberalism
|
|
Humanism
|
Caring
|
Service
|
|
Morality
|
Self-Regulation
|
Common Greater Good
|
|
Safety
|
Experimentation
|
Epistemology from Virtue
|
While the above table is an oversimplified first shot at
propositional reasoning in group dynamic anchors, it also aims at provoking
newer linkages between reality and abstraction.
Here again, I have two explorations. Firstly, that Terminal Values
(a la Rokeach) are possibly the domain of automatic perception. Shareable
attitudes in society get socialized through overt behaviors that are observed (even
from facial cues) and thereafter role modeled. Treatment of experiences finds
reflected meta-states of higher-order learning. These relate to superior use of
the pre-frontal cortex, that tap into perceptual bases as also pertinent memory
chained through categories of perceptual triggers. This chain of mentifacts
become strings of belief systems as coherent distinct philosophies.
Secondly, social psychology has been processed rather
superficially in professional education. Application of behavioural sciences
may miss the link between competing values riddled with in-group attentional
biases on the one hand, and fearful amygdala responses of threat or novelty,
when known comforts – even if material or economic – numb our choices. So,
virtues are impoverished further when philosophic thought is discouraged in the
shorter-order comfort of predictability.
Alright, I am warned of your own attention span while reading what
is here. What’s your reflection anyway?
